BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS (BETR)
Financials · Digital mortgage origination / fintech lending · NASDAQ
A technology-enabled mortgage platform digitizing the homeownership journey through proprietary origination technology and strategic partner licensing, despite current unprofitability and industry headwinds.
What BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS does
Better Home & Finance is a technology-enabled homeownership platform that offers mortgage, home equity, and related products through a digital-first approach. The company originated $4.7 billion in funded loan volume in 2025, growing revenue 52% year-over-year to $164.9 million. Better serves consumers across key homeownership stages—purchase, ownership, refinance, and sale—primarily by selling originated loans to GSEs, banks, and other institutional purchasers, while also licensing its proprietary Tinman technology platform to third-party strategic partners.
Themes: mortgage origination / residential lending, digital homeownership platform, mortgage technology / fintech, B2B mortgage technology licensing, home equity products
Fundamentals
- Price$11.68 as of 2026-08-21 close
- Market cap$283M as of 2026-08-24
- 1-year return-30.3% 2025-08-21 close $16.76 → 2026-08-21 close $11.68
- P/En/a negative earnings
- Net margin-83.7% as of 2026-08-24
- Gross margin+81.0% as of 2026-08-24
- ROE-452.2% as of 2026-08-24
- Debt / equity82.59 as of 2026-08-24
- Revenue growth (YoY)+56.4% as of 2026-08-24
- Revenue CAGR (3y)+137.5% SEC XBRL
- Beta1.70 as of 2026-08-24
- Last reported earnings2026-08-06 SEC EDGAR Form 8-K (Item 2.02)
How BETR compares in its sector
- net profit marginbottom 10% 538 covered Financials peers, as of 2026-08-24
- operating marginbottom 10% 534 covered Financials peers, as of 2026-08-24
- gross marginmiddle range 176 covered Financials peers, as of 2026-08-24
- return on equitybottom 10% 575 covered Financials peers, as of 2026-08-24
- 3-year revenue CAGRtop 10% 347 covered Financials peers
- free cash flow (absolute dollars, latest fiscal year)bottom 10% 431 covered Financials peers, as of FY2025
Position among covered Financials companies that report each metric (minimum 5 peers). A relative position within our covered catalog — not a valuation, quality, or investment judgment. A higher percentile is simply a higher value (for P/E, more expensive on earnings — never "better"). Informational only.
How BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS looks technically
BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS (BETR) is trading 67.0% below its 200-day average, the long-term trend line — a long-term downtrend. Its 50-day average crossed below its 200-day average about 113 trading days ago — a "death cross", a bearish long-term signal. A strong downtrend is in place — ADX, a 0–100 trend-strength gauge, is 30, with sellers in control. Momentum is neutral — its 14-day RSI (a 0–100 momentum gauge) is 31, neither overbought (above 70) nor oversold (below 30). It made a new 20-day low about 2 trading days ago. It is 87.6% below its highest point of the past year.
Trend
8
| Distance from the 200-day | it is trading 67.0% below its 200-day average, the long-term trend line — a long-term downtrend | -67.0% |
|---|---|---|
| 50-day moving average | its average price over the last 50 trading days — a short-term trend line — is $22.33 | $22.33 |
| 200-day moving average | its average price over the last 200 trading days — the long-term trend line — is $35.40 | $35.40 |
| Swing structure | each recent peak has been lower than the one before it and each dip deeper — the pattern chart-watchers call a downtrend, which describes where price has already been and not where it goes next | lower highs and lower lows |
| Last swing turn | its last significant turn was a swing high 50 calendar days ago — the swings before that are what the structure reading is measured on | 50 sessions |
| Wave structure | its recent swings can be read as a five-part downward sequence — what Elliott-wave chartists call an impulse — now in leg 5 of five; the labelling fails if price closes above 32.16. It is the only labelling that fits, and it describes the swings already printed, not what comes next. | possible downward five-wave sequence, in wave 5 |
| Since the 50/200 cross | its 50-day average crossed below its 200-day average about 113 trading days ago — a "death cross", a bearish long-term signal | 113 sessions |
| Trend strength (14-day ADX) | a strong downtrend is in place — ADX, a 0–100 trend-strength gauge, is 30, with sellers in control | 29.8 |
Momentum
3
| 14-day RSI | momentum is neutral — its 14-day RSI (a 0–100 momentum gauge) is 31, neither overbought (above 70) nor oversold (below 30) | 30.9 |
|---|---|---|
| Position in its 14-day range | it is trading right at the bottom of its 14-day range ($11.11 to $23.11) — its "stochastic" reading is 5 out of 100, where 0 would mean closing exactly at the 14-session low and 100 exactly at the high. This measures WHERE the price sits inside its recent range, which is a different question from the RSI beside it: RSI is a momentum gauge, measuring how FAST the price has been moving, so a stock can drift quietly to the bottom of its range with an ordinary RSI, or fall sharply and still sit in the middle. It has been climbing within that range over the last few sessions. | 4.7 |
| Since the MACD crossed zero | MACD, a trend-momentum gauge, is in negative territory (momentum leaning bearish) | 13 sessions |
Range
12
| 52-week high | its highest closing price over the past year (about 252 trading days) was $94.06 | $94.06 |
|---|---|---|
| From the 52-week high | it is 87.6% below its 52-week high (its highest price of the past year) | -87.6% |
| Above the 52-week low | it is 5.1% above its 52-week low (its lowest price of the past year) | +5.1% |
| Below the 52-week high | it is 87.6% below its highest point of the past year | 87.6% |
| Since a 20-day breakout | it made a new 20-day low about 2 trading days ago | 2 sessions |
| Since a 55-day breakout | it made a new 55-day low about 2 trading days ago | 2 sessions |
| All-time high | its highest closing price on record is $94.06 (set on 2025-09-22) | $94.06 |
| Given back of the 52-week move | over the past year its closes ranged ($11.60 to $86.07), and it has recovered essentially none of its fall from last year’s high — 0% of it. Chart-watchers call 61.8%-65% given back the "golden pocket" — for this company that is $57.62 to $60.01. It is watched widely enough that orders cluster there, which is the honest reason it matters; it is not a forecast. | 0.1% |
| From the all-time high | it is 87.6% below its all-time high | -87.6% |
| Nearest price level | it is trading 0.9% above a support level at $11.57 — a price it turned at twice since 2025-01-23, most recently on 2025-03-03. Since 2024-08-21 it has 3 such levels below the current price and 12 above. Levels like these describe where the price has reversed or paused before; they are not a forecast of where it will go. | -0.9% |
| All-time low | its lowest closing price on record is $7.71 (set on 2025-01-13) | $7.71 |
| Above the all-time low | it is 51.6% above its all-time low | +51.5% |
Volatility
5
| Band width vs its own 6 months | day-to-day price swings are unusually wide versus its own recent history (wider than about 99% of the past ~6 months) | 99th percentile |
|---|---|---|
| Typical daily range | in a typical session it travels about $2.07 between its high and its low — about 17.7% of its price. That is its "average true range" over the last 14 sessions, which also counts the distance from the previous close, so a day that opens well away from yesterday counts as the large move it was | $2.07 |
| Bollinger bands (20-day, ±2σ) | most of its recent trading has stayed between about $8.71 and $25.77 — the "Bollinger bands", a range drawn two standard deviations either side of its 20-day average price, which widens when the stock gets more volatile and narrows when it settles | $8.71 – $17.24 – $25.77 |
| Typical daily range (% of price) | its price moves about 17.7% in a typical session — among the most volatile in the catalog. This is the average gap between a session's high and low over the last 14 sessions, counting overnight moves, expressed against the current price so it can be compared with companies trading at any price | 17.7% |
| Stretch from the 200-day average | it is trading 11.5 daily ranges below its 200-day average price (67.0% below it in plain percentage terms) — a way of asking how far it has stretched from its own average in units of how far it normally moves in a day, so a calm company and a jumpy one can be compared on the same scale | 11.5 daily ranges below its 200-day average |
Volume
1
| Volume vs its 30-day average | trading volume is about normal versus its 30-day average | 1.02× |
|---|
Analyst
2
| Change in the average price target | analysts have cut their average price target by 23.4% since the prior reading | -23.4% |
|---|---|---|
| Change in the consensus rating | the analyst consensus rating has softened toward "sell" since the prior reading | 0.29 toward sell |
Candlestick patterns
1
| Since a doji | today it opened and closed at almost the same price after trading through a wider range — a "doji", the classic picture of buyers and sellers finishing the session level | today |
|---|
Price gaps
3
| Gap at the open | it opened on 2026-08-21 1.1% above the previous session's close — an overnight gap, the part of the move that happened while the market was shut, and traded back through that level before the close | +1.1% |
|---|---|---|
| Open gap | it gapped 2.3% below the previous close 8 sessions ago and has not traded back through the level it left behind at 18.05 — an "unfilled gap", which describes a price range no trade has since crossed and is not a forecast that it will be crossed | -2.3% |
| Gap filled | a 2.4% gap down opened on 2026-08-18 has been "filled" 3 sessions ago — price traded back through the level the gap left behind, and it closed again during the very session that opened it | 3 sessions ago |
Price streaks
1
| Closing streak | it closed higher in its latest session, after a session that did not close higher — a single up day rather than a run | 1 session up |
|---|
Relative strength
4
| vs market, 1 month | over the past 1 month this stock lagged the market by 52.9 percentage points (the stock lost 50.6% while the market gained 2.3%) | -52.9% |
|---|---|---|
| vs market, 3 months | over the past 3 months this stock lagged the market by 56.4 percentage points (the stock lost 53.3% while the market gained 3.1%) | -56.4% |
| vs market, 6 months | over the past 6 months this stock lagged the market by 70.5 percentage points (the stock lost 59.4% while the market gained 11.1%) | -70.5% |
| vs market, 12 months | over the past 12 months this stock lagged the market by 50.8 percentage points (the stock lost 30.3% while the market gained 20.5%) | -50.8% |
Signal agreement
2
| Bullish technical signals | 1 of the 9 technical signals we can compute for it is currently in a bullish state: near the bottom of its 14-day range (oversold) — these describe past price behaviour, not a forecast | 1 of 9 |
|---|---|---|
| Bearish technical signals | 7 of the 9 technical signals we can compute for it are currently in a bearish state: a strong downtrend, with sellers in control, a "death cross" — its 50-day average is below its 200-day, trading below its 200-day average, a fresh 20-day low, MACD momentum is negative, lagging the market over 6 months, trading below the Ichimoku cloud — these describe past price behaviour, not a forecast | 7 of 9 |
Trend (Ichimoku cloud)
1
| Vs the Ichimoku cloud | trading 56% below the Ichimoku cloud — a band drawn from where its own highs and lows sat up to 2026-07-16 and projected forward over today's price, the side traders read as an established downtrend, with the band above acting as the level that would have to be cleared. The band itself is thick, spanning 79.8% of the share price, which is taken to mean a barrier that has held for a while and takes effort to cross. | -56.4% |
|---|
Volume-weighted price
2
| Vs this year’s average price paid | the price is 60% below the average price paid so far this year, so the typical buyer over that stretch is under water. That average is $28.89 — a volume-weighted average of daily closes over 150 sessions, not a true tick-by-tick VWAP. | -59.6% |
|---|---|---|
| Vs the average paid since it last reported | the price is 24% below the average price paid since it last reported on 2026-08-04 (its 8-K), so the typical buyer over that stretch is under water. That average is $15.35 — a volume-weighted average of daily closes over 14 sessions, not a true tick-by-tick VWAP. | -23.9% |
Price levels it has turned at before
BETR last closed at $11.68 on 2026-08-21. Since 2024-08-21 it has turned at 3 prices below its last close and 12 above; the 3 nearest below and the 3 nearest above are listed, nearest first.
| Level | Side | Distance | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| $11.57 | Support | 0.9% below the last close | turned there twice · 2025-01-23 to 2025-03-03 |
| $11.90 | Resistance | 1.9% above the last close | turned there twice · 2024-11-21 to 2025-06-27 |
| $12.36 | Resistance | 5.8% above the last close | turned there three times · 2025-02-05 to 2025-05-23 |
| $12.57 | Resistance | 7.6% above the last close | turned there twice · 2025-05-08 to 2025-07-31 |
| $9.51 | Support | 18.6% below the last close | turned there twice · 2024-12-19 to 2025-04-04 |
| $8.85 | Support | 24.3% below the last close | turned there twice · 2024-12-31 to 2025-03-10 |
A level is a price this company reversed or paused at more than once — they describe past behaviour, not a forecast of where the price will go.
Wave structure
Its recent swings can be read as a five-part downward sequence — what Elliott-wave chartists call an impulse — now in leg 5 of five.
This labelling fails — stops being a possible reading at all — if it closes above $32.16.
It is the only labelling that fits these swings, though its proportions are not the textbook ones. It was chosen from 3 labellings that survived the rules, counting shorter readings of the same bars.
On past moves of this shape the leg has usually ended somewhere between $12.47 and $24.64 — that is where it has tended to end if the count holds, not a forecast of where the price goes.
This labelling was already in place when we began recording count changes on 2026-08-13, so how long it has stood is not something we can say yet.
Read from daily closes as of 2026-08-21.
An Elliott-wave count describes the swings already printed and the level that would disprove it. It is not a forecast, a target, or advice.
Screens: Trading below the 200-day moving average · Pulled back from the 12-month high · Broke down to a new 20-day low · Analyst price target recently CUT · lagging the market · Printed a doji candle | Learn: moving average · golden cross · adx · rsi · breakout · fifty two week high low
Based on daily closing prices as of 2026-08-21. Describes past price behavior only — informational, not financial advice.
Analyst consensus
- Consensus ratingBuy (1.71 mean, 1=Strong Buy…5=Strong Sell) — 6 analysts
- Mean price target$25.67 range $16.00 – $35.00; median $25.00
Analyst estimates, as of 2026-08-18. These are third-party analyst opinions and price targets, aggregated — not a recommendation, prediction, or advice from stocks-llm. Informational only.
Analyst EPS estimate for BETR
- Consensus EPS estimate-$1.23 next reporting period, as of 2026-08-18
Change over time is not available yet: it needs two readings of the same reporting period at least 30 days apart, and we have been recording these estimates since 2026-08-04. An estimate for a DIFFERENT quarter is not a revision, so a reading from before the last report is never compared with one after it.
The consensus estimate for the next reporting period, and how it has moved between readings of that SAME period. A change is measured only between readings estimating one period — when a company reports, the consensus moves to the next quarter and the two numbers are not comparable. Informational only, not a forecast and not advice.
Key risks (from latest filing)
["Elevated interest rates and lower home sales/refinancing activity materially impact mortgage origination volumes, revenue, and profitability","Company is unprofitable (net loss of $165.9M in 2025) and depends on raising additional financing to sustain operations and achieve profitability","Regulatory complexity and compliance requirements across mortgage lending, including GSE conformance standards and state licensing, create operational and legal risks"]
What changed in the latest 10-Q
AI-assisted comparison of BETR's 10-Q filed 2026-05-11 against the prior one filed 2025-11-13.
Management's Discussion & Analysis (MD&A)
- Added:
- Newer filing explicitly states company is 'AI-native home finance company' (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing mentions Tinman platform trained on $110B in origination volume with 38% volume share growth from 2024 to 2025 (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing includes statement: 'Tinman is not just the engine behind Better; it is how we are modernizing the broader mortgage industry' (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing describes Tinman as partnering with lenders, banks, and financial institutions (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing discusses Federal Reserve maintaining federal funds rate within 3.50%-3.75% range in Q1 2026 (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing mentions geopolitical uncertainty including Middle East conflict affecting financial markets (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing states lenders with diversified products across purchase and non-mortgage (home equity) are better positioned (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing discloses determination to dispose of Birmingham Bank with assets classified as held for sale (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing states business has been 'streamlined to focus on two key sourcing channels: D2C channel and Platform channel' (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing describes 'in-market loan officer teams, which ramped over the course of 2025' (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing explains Platform channel partnerships in different structures where partners originate loans and Better provides technology (2026-05-11)
- Newer filing includes section on 'International Lending Revenue' describing U.K. activities and 2024 plan to sell U.K. entities with Q3 2025 completion of one sale (2026-05-11)
- Removed:
- Older filing's description of 'next-generation platform that we believe can revolutionize the world's largest, oldest and most tangible asset class' removed (2025-11-13)
- Older filing's reference to Betsy, 'the first voice-based AI loan assistant built for the mortgage industry' removed (2025-11-13)
- Older filing's statement about 'all homeownership products embedded into a highly automated, single flow' removed (2025-11-13)
- Older filing's statement 'We serve customers in all 50 US states and the United Kingdom' removed (2026-05-11)
- Older filing's three-channel customer acquisition model (D2C, B2B, Retail) replaced with two-channel model (2026-05-11)
- Older filing's discussion of integrated relationship with Ally Bank and its termination removed (2026-05-11)
- Older filing's narrative about hiring NEO Home Loans executive team in Q3 2024 removed (2026-05-11)
- Older filing's references to 'NEO Powered by Better' brand removed (2026-05-11)
- Older filing's discussion of strategic partnerships with top five personal financial services platform, top five non-bank mortgage originator, and Finance of America removed (2026-05-11)
- Older filing's revenue table for nine months ended September 30 removed (2026-05-11)
- Older filing's explanation of B2B channel generating revenue from 'integrated relationships and advertising relationships' removed (2026-05-11)
- Reworded:
- Company description changed from 'building a next-generation platform' to 'AI-native home finance company on a mission' (2025-11-13 vs 2026-05-11)
- Mission statement changed from 'lowering the hurdles to homeownership by offering the lowest prices and the best experience' to 'make homeownership cheaper, faster, and more accessible for all Americans' (2025-11-13 vs 2026-05-11)
- Tinman description changed from 'proprietary loan origination platform that uses AI and automation' to 'proprietary platform...trained on $110B in origination volume' (2025-11-13 vs 2026-05-11)
- Company focus changed from 'technology-driven organization' seeking to 'disrupt a business model' to 'designed to scale across products, channels, and market conditions' (2025-11-13 vs 2026-05-11)
- Reference period changed from 'three and nine months ended September 30, 2025 and 2024' to 'three months ended March 31, 2026 and 2025' (2025-11-13 vs 2026-05-11)
- Channel nomenclature: 'B2B channel' and 'Retail channel' in older filing vs 'Platform channel' in newer filing (2025-11-13 vs 2026-05-11)
- Gain on loans, net percentages changed from 83% (Q3 2025) to 95% (Q1 2026) of total revenue (2025-11-13 vs 2026-05-11)
- Other revenue percentages changed from 6% (Q3 2025) to 2% (Q1 2026) of total revenue (2025-11-13 vs 2026-05-11)
- Net interest income percentages changed from 11% (Q3 2025) to 3% (Q1 2026) of total revenue (2025-11-13 vs 2026-05-11)
- Notes:
- Older filing covers period ended September 30, 2025; newer filing covers period ended March 31, 2026, representing different fiscal periods
- Older filing references audited statements for year ended December 31, 2024; newer filing references December 31, 2025
- Comparison reflects strategic and operational changes between the two quarterly reporting periods
Risk Factors
The two filings could not be meaningfully compared for this section.
AI-assisted comparison of two SEC filing sections. It describes wording and theme changes only, makes no materiality, legal, or investment judgement, and is not financial advice. Informational only — not financial advice.
Insider activity (SEC Form 4)
1 open-market purchase and 1 open-market sale by insiders in the last 90 days.
- Last 30 days0 buys · 1 sell ($42508) — 1 selling insider
- Last 90 days1 buy ($125351) · 1 sell ($42508) — 1 buying, 1 selling insiders
- Last 180 days24 buys ($4M) · 4 sells ($116562) — 7 buying, 1 selling insiders
Cluster buying: 6 different insiders reported open-market purchases (SEC code P) of BETR within a 30-day window between 2026-04-08 and 2026-05-08. Disclosed Form 4 activity, not a prediction of performance or a buy signal.
Activity heuristic: mixed (a transparent product heuristic from the counts above, not a prediction or advice)
Most recent open-market transaction: 2026-08-19. As of 2026-08-25.
View full insider trading history → View SEC Form 3/4/5 filingsAsk about BETR's insider activity →
Only open-market purchases (SEC code P) and sales (code S) are counted here. Option exercises, vesting/awards, gifts, and shares withheld for taxes are excluded — they are compensation or mechanical, not open-market conviction. Sales may be planned and non-discretionary (e.g. a Rule 10b5-1 plan) and are not necessarily bearish; open-market buying is not a recommendation to buy. Informational only — not financial advice.
Institutional ownership (13F)
4 institutional 13F filers reported holding BETR as of 2026-03-31 (quarter-end position, filed within 45 days).
- Distinct 13F filers 4
- Reported shares held 979,327
- Reported value $34,883,627
reported quarterly holdings change (2025-12-31 → 2026-03-31): 0 new, 4 increased, 0 decreased, 0 exited. Change counts cover only managers that filed 13F reports in BOTH quarters, derived between two quarter-end snapshots — not same-day trades; a single manager is never said to have "bought" or "sold".
Institutional holdings are quarter-end long positions reported on SEC Form 13F-HR, filed up to 45 days after the quarter ends — they are delayed, are not real-time trades, exclude short positions and most non-US securities, and are not investment advice. Any increase/decrease is a reported change between two quarterly snapshots, not a same-day purchase or sale. These are quarter-end snapshots from the 13F filings on SEC EDGAR, filed within 45 days — not real-time, and any change is a difference between two quarterly reports, not a same-day trade. Informational only — not financial advice.
Short interest (FINRA)
BETR had 2,483,707 shares of reported short interest as of the 2026-07-31 FINRA settlement date (delayed, bi-monthly; not real-time).
Short interest as a percent of shares outstanding is not shown for BETR because we do not hold a verified share count to divide it by. The reported figures above are unaffected.
- Reported short interest (shares) 2,483,707
- Prior settlement (shares) 2,406,901
- Reported change 3.19%
- Days to cover (reported) 11.6
Reported to FINRA as of the 2026-07-31 settlement date. Short interest is reported to FINRA and published on a delayed, bi-monthly schedule (as of a settlement date, disseminated roughly eight business days later) — it is NOT real-time, does not cover every venue or all US trading, and is not a short-squeeze prediction or investment advice. Days-to-cover is the value FINRA reports; percent of float is not shown because the source file carries no share-count denominator — where a percent appears it is of shares OUTSTANDING, the larger base, and is therefore a floor on percent of float. Informational only — not financial advice.
Competitors & peers
- Rocket Companies / Quicken Loans
- Loan Depot
- Blend Labs
- Better.com's traditional bank mortgage divisions
- Roofstock
AI-enriched competitor set. Linked names are companies covered by stocks-llm; other named peers are shown for reference only.
Compare BETR vs…
Frequently asked questions
What does BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS (BETR) do?
Better Home & Finance is a technology-enabled homeownership platform that offers mortgage, home equity, and related products through a digital-first approach. The company originated $4.7 billion in funded loan volume in 2025, growing revenue 52% year-over-year to $164.9 million. Better serves consumers across key homeownership stages—purchase, ownership, refinance, and sale—primarily by selling originated loans to GSEs, banks, and other institutional purchasers, while also licensing its…
What sector is BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS (BETR) in?
BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS (BETR) is classified in the Financials sector. Its industry is Digital mortgage origination / fintech lending. It trades on NASDAQ.
Who are BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS's (BETR) competitors?
Notable peers of BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS (BETR) include Rocket Companies / Quicken Loans, Loan Depot, Blend Labs, Better.com's traditional bank mortgage divisions and Roofstock. This peer set is informational only — not financial advice.
Is BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS (BETR) overbought or oversold right now?
BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS (BETR) is currently neither overbought nor oversold — its 14-day RSI (a 0–100 momentum gauge) is 31, in the neutral middle (as of 2026-08-21). RSI describes recent price momentum, not a forecast — informational only, not financial advice.
Where does stocks-llm's data on BETR come from?
Fundamentals and prices come from market data, as of 2026-08-24; company filings and profile facts come from SEC EDGAR. All figures are delayed daily-close data shown with their as-of date — informational only, not financial advice.
Fundamentals: market data, as of 2026-08-24. Filings: SEC EDGAR. Prices are delayed daily-close data.
Last updated 2026-08-21.
Informational only — NOT financial advice. All figures are delayed daily-close data from SEC EDGAR & market data, shown with their as-of date.